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Abstract: 
The crisis that has affected East Asia since the middle of 1997 has raised a number of important questions 
about the styles of economic and political organisation that predominate in the region. Much attention has 
been paid to the apparent need for reform, particularly along the sorts of  market-centred lines advocated by 
organisations like APEC and the IMF. And yet despite the difficult conditions confronting many Asian 
economies, there is a continuing resistance to such reforms on the part of a number of regional political 
elites. This paper explores the sources of this resistance, and argues that it is best understood as flowing 
from an enduring  desire for economic security that has been central to East Asian patterns of public policy. 
 
Introduction 
In the wake of the multi-dimensional crisis that has swept through East Asia over the last 
couple of years, advocates of ‘convergence’ theories of economic and political 
development might, at first blush, seem vindicated. Clearly, a number of countries in 
Southeast and Northeast Asia, (hereafter East Asia), appear to be undertaking major 
structural transformations of some of their most important domestic institutions and 
moving toward a more market-centred economic order. Moreover, the complex social 
and political relationships within which these institutions are embedded – often 
caricatured under the ideologically-loaded rubric of ‘crony capitalism’ – appear to be 
subject to irresistible reformist pressures, particularly from powerful external actors. In 
short, the conventional wisdom in the wake of the crisis has rapidly become that the 
smaller economies of East Asia in particular are especially vulnerable to a range of 
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political constraints and economic imperatives that leave them with little alternative other 
than to embrace the increasingly ubiquitous market-centred, neoliberal ‘Washington 
consensus’. Yet a closer examination of the region in the wake of the crisis suggests that 
not only has its impact varied across countries, but so have national policy responses.  
 
The intention of this paper is not to undertake yet another overview of the crisis and its 
possible antecedents, of which there is already a significant number.1 Rather, the 
intention here is to place the crisis in a larger historical framework that may help to 
explain both the diversity of policy responses to apparently ubiquitous economic 
challenges, as well as the continuing  resistance to neoliberal orthodoxy in East Asia. 
Seen in this light, the failure of existent inter-governmental mechanisms like the Asia 
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum to either promote effective market-centred 
reform within the region before the crisis, or to play a more prominent role in managing  
the crisis itself, becomes more understandable. Again, it is important to emphasise at the 
outset, that the intention is not to provide a detailed picture of the activities of APEC 
itself, but to provide an account that helps make resistance to its reformist agenda, both 
before and after the crisis, more comprehensible. 
 
The paper proceeds by outlining the distinctive traditions of public policy that have 
characterised economic development in East Asia. I suggest that a very different 
conception of security, one that places great emphasis on its economic aspects and the 
pursuit of relative national autonomy, has played an important role in defining economic 
ideas and the concomitant role of the state in the region. Moreover, the close links 
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between – indeed, the inseparability of  - the political and economic spheres in many East 
Asian states means that reform poses particularly difficult problems for existing political 
elites and their hitherto central roles in domestic economies. I illustrate this contention by 
revisiting a number of prominent contributions to the ‘Asian values’ debate, and suggest 
that this may not be the spent force many commentators seem to feel. Self-serving and 
tendentious as this discourse may have been, some of its more acute proponents did 
identify one issue that may continue to shape debates over the appropriate roles to be 
played by states and markets: neoliberalism can be deeply corrosive of established social 
patterns and  orders, an observation that was central to Asian critiques of Western 
capitalism prior to the crisis. In a region where the legitimacy of the dominant political 
class is often intimately bound up with, if not dependent upon its ability to deliver 
continuing economic expansion, and in which often only rudimentary compensatory 
social welfare mechanisms exist, neoliberalism represents a profound threat, and one that 
may prove increasingly difficult to resist. 
 
Economic Security in East Asia 
 
At the heart of the lack of enthusiasm, if not outright hostility in East Asia  towards the 
sorts of market-centred reforms that APEC has long championed are fundamentally 
different conceptions of economic security and the role that states should play in its 
achievement. To put this matter somewhat baldly, whereas the Anglo-American nations2 
normatively privilege market-determined economic outcomes in which the state gets out 
of the way of private sector economic actors, in Asia the state has traditionally played a 
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much larger, highly interventionist role in shaping the course of economic development. 
It is important to emphasise an initial tension that this somewhat stylised depiction of 
East Asian and Anglo-American forms of political and economic organisation highlights, 
for it is central to competing conceptions of economic security. As Buzan et al point out,3 
in a capitalist system ‘the actors in a market are supposed to feel insecure’, making the 
achievement of sustainable economic security inherently problematic. The contradictory, 
potentially volatile nature of privately controlled economic activity is of itself a challenge 
for policymakers of any country, but where political elites are also intimately connected 
with, if not actively involved in economic activity, then accommodating the dynamic 
qualities of capitalist economic organisation presents particular problems. 
 
One of the key challenges for East Asia - or more accurately, the ruling elites that have 
governed the various nations that constitute this complex region - has been to take 
advantage of the dynamism of the market-centred capitalist order, while simultaneously 
maintaining indigenous structures of power and authority. Before considering 
contemporary responses to this challenge, it is as well to remind ourselves of what a 
profound imprint this continuing dialectic between states and markets has made on the 
region. 
 
The historical legacy 
 
One of the key factors shaping the historical evolution of the East Asian region over the 
last several centuries has been contact with the expanding capitalist powers of initially 
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Europe and latterly the US. Indeed, the very conception of a distinct East Asian region is 
largely an expression of a somewhat arbitrarily defined geographical space in opposition 
to some European or external ‘other’. The principal significance of this historical contact 
between East Asia and ‘the West’4 in the context of the current discussion, however, has 
been firstly that it helped establish particular patterns of relationships both at the intra- 
and trans-regional levels, and secondly that it was instrumental in consolidating specific 
forms of governmental practice. It is important to emphasise at the outset that the long-
run historical pattern of interaction between East Asia and the Anglo-American powers in 
particular has not been to simply replicate dominant patterns of Western economic 
organisation or political systems. On the contrary, many of the most distinctive and 
enduring political structures and economic practices in East Asia have emerged as a 
defensive or competitive response to the challenge of Western encroachment. 
 
Revisiting the first phases of the intensifying political and economic contact between the 
East Asia and the West is instructive not simply because it provides a more nuanced 
reading of contemporary developments, but it reminds us that there  never has been a 
single East Asian model or policy response to either the challenges of colonial expansion 
or the more recent globalisation phenomenon. The very different historical experiences of 
the two leading East Asian powers - China and Japan – are stark reminders of both the 
possibility of national differentiation in the face of ubiquitous challenges, and of the 
potential  importance of domestic policy.5 Japan’s remarkably successful adaptation to 
the expansion of an increasingly global capitalist economic system from its European 
heartland in the nineteenth century is a revealing contrast to the Chinese response. The 
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important point to emphasise here is that both paths – that is, comparatively successful 
accommodation in Japan or traumatic disintegration in China – have left important 
historical legacies, neither of which is ultimately conducive to the seamless adoption of a 
neoliberal economic order in the contemporary period. 
 
Whatever the future status of China in the coming century may be, thus far Japan has 
played a pivotal role both as the engine of East Asia’s contemporary development and as 
a possible role model for countries in the region. The pioneer of the ‘developmental 
state’,6  Japan has provided the most important example of successful, sustained, large-
scale industrially-based economic development outside of North America and Europe. 
Importantly, even South Korea, which may yet recover to eclipse some of its European 
rivals, has followed a Japanese-inspired developmental path that has systematically 
eschewed a reliance on market mechanisms in favour of state-planning and collaborative 
relations between government and business.7 Whatever the long-term merits or 
sustainability of this model may ultimately prove to be, the point to emphasise here is that 
the developmental state is deeply embedded in the social relations and institutions of 
many East Asian countries as a – until recently, at least –  legitimate and central 
component of national economic organisation. 
 
Moreover, even those countries like China that were either initially less successful in 
adapting to the challenge of the rising Western powers, or which had their domestic 
political and economic development profoundly altered by the colonial experience, as in 
Southeast Asia, have also developed domestic economic structures and political practices 
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that are highly contingent responses to external and internal imperatives and which 
generally bear little resistance to their Western counterparts. Again, the point to stress 
here is that even though ‘socialist’ China may be irrevocably on the capitalist road, it 
remains a form of capitalism with decidedly Chinese characteristics. The power 
structures and political leaders that were in place before the current phase of integration 
with the global economy have assumed control of and imparted a distinctive, state 
dominated character to the embrace of capitalism.8  Similarly, in the smaller economies 
of Southeast Asia, like Indonesia, the degree of market liberalisation and the extent of 
state control has usually been a function of external imperatives such as fluctuating oil 
prices, rather than any innate enthusiasm for relinquishing control over economic activity 
or conversion to the technocratic merits of neoclassical orthodoxy.9 
 
Comprehensive security 
 
In order to understand the sorts of responses to the crisis that have emerged in East Asia, 
and the continuing wariness about embracing wholesale market-centred reform,  a 
contrast needs to be made between East Asian and Western conceptions of security.10 The 
key point to stress in this regard is that in East Asia security is conceived of much more 
broadly than it is in the West. The preoccupation of much influential, predominantly 
North American, realist scholarship with the more conventional military aspects of 
security has meant that the more complex and comprehensive approach to security in 
East Asia has often been under-appreciated and theorised.11 This is not to suggest that the 
military aspects of the security equation are taken less seriously than they are in the West. 
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On the contrary, one of the great benefits of successful economic expansion from the 
perspective of existent ruling elites, at least,  is to consolidate their international and 
domestic positions through new arms purchases.12 In other words, East Asia’s security 
problematique is shaped by a complex array of factors the resolution of which is largely 
dependent on continuing economic certainty. 
 
One of the key differences between East Asia’s security position and that of the West, 
therefore, revolves around the relationship between political and economic power. Two 
aspects of this inter-relationship are especially important in an East Asian context: the 
region’s ‘late’ industrialisation, and the comparatively recent birth of a number of East 
Asian states following decolonisation. The approach taken to security issues, in other 
words, will reflect contingent economic and political forces which may themselves be a 
function of the timing, sequence and stage of economic development.13   
 
Japan is, once again, the key nation as far as regional industrialisation is concerned. To 
overcome the disadvantages of late development and the difficulty of breaking into an 
existent world economy dominated by the established industrial powers, Japan pioneered 
a range of trade and industry policies that allowed it to rapidly ‘catch up’ with,  and 
subsequently overtake much of the West. Importantly, this remarkable feat was achieved 
by harnessing political and economic power and systematically privileging national 
interests. These essentially mercantilist policies were tolerated because the US was 
preoccupied with the more conventional aspects of Cold War security, in which Japan 
was seen as a crucial bulwark against possible communist expansion.14 Consequently, 
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Japan was able to develop a ‘comprehensive security’ policy dedicated to securing 
Japanese access to or control over key resources for domestic industry.15 In this 
conception, economic autonomy was not only a key goal of state policy, but was also 
conceived of as a central element of national security. The traumas of  the Second World 
War and the failure of Japan’s Co-Prosperity sphere demonstrated both Japan’s resource 
vulnerability and the limits of militaristic solutions to this dilemma. The complex web 
corporate and diplomatic that Japan has spun across East Asia also demonstrates that 
there are more subtle ways of achieving economic hegemony in the region.16 Despite its 
regional prominence, however, Japan – like its export-oriented neighbours – has 
remained dependent on the critically important markets of North America, 17  and thus 
potentially vulnerable to a range of economic and political pressures. 
 
Two points merit particular emphasis from this brief consideration of the security posture 
of the region’s most significant economic actor. First, Japanese planners have never 
shown any enthusiasm for or confidence in market mechanisms when national security is 
at stake. In a nation which still perceives itself as being economically vulnerable it will 
require more than simply a change of policy direction or the lowering of some of Japan’s 
more visible trade barriers to fundamentally affect established political and economic 
practices. This leads to a second point: as particular regimes become socially embedded 
they may develop into what Kent Calder describes as ‘circles of compensation’,18 or self-
serving constellations of political power dedicated to furthering the interests of their 
members. In such circumstances, it becomes much easier to see why Japan has been 
reluctant to stick to its APEC’s trade liberalisation agenda, and why its claim to represent 
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a widely held Asian view is so significant.19 In a region where conceptions of national 
security are predicated upon states rather than markets, and where political and economic 
interests are intimately connected, the Japanese experience is not atypical. 
 
In the newer of states of Southeast Asia, the links between the political and economic 
spheres are generally even more intense - as are the concomitant contradictions. From the 
perspective of national security, however, there are a number of specific issues which are 
common to many states within the periphery. Amongst the more pressing sources of 
insecurity are, Ayoob suggests, ‘the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, 
state institutions, and regimes; inadequate social cohesion; and the absence of societal 
consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic and political organisation’.20 In 
such circumstances, it is the internal dimension of security, rather than the conventional 
inter-national concerns that dominates much Western policy and theory, which is of 
greatest significance in many of the newer states. Given such a predominantly domestic 
calculus of strategic concerns, the multi-faceted nature of security becomes more 
comprehensible. A key difference between  states in the periphery and the experience of 
the European capitalist states is that in the former state-making has often been a highly 
truncated, far less organic process. Rather than the balance of social, political and 
military forces emerging from a complex historical dialectic as they did in Europe, state 
forms have been imposed on often arbitrarily demarcated geographic spaces in the 
periphery, distorting development and frequently granting a disproportionate influence to 
the military.21 Again, when placed in their specific historical contexts the sorts of 
political structures that have emerged in countries like Indonesia, where the military has 
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had a pre-eminent role in the nation’s political and economic life, becomes more 
comprehensible. Likewise, it is equally possible to appreciate the primacy attached to 
internal security and the difficulty of attempting to establish a new market-centred 
economic order.  
 
 Asian values and economic ideas 
 
One of the more noteworthy  aspects of East Asia’s remarkable economic transformation 
has been the emergence of so-called ‘Asian values’. Although this phenomenon is 
currently a much less prominent part of East Asian political discourse than it was during 
the halcyon days of the ‘Asian miracle’, it provides an important insight into influential  
East Asian ideas about development issues and the appropriate roles of states and 
markets. Moreover, it is a strand of thinking that has neither disappeared nor been 
completely discredited in many parts of the region. 
 
Some of the finer points of the Asian values discourse have been lost in a debate that has 
occurred at a remarkably high level of generality, often bordering on caricature. Samuel 
Huntington’s notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’ is perhaps the most widely known 
expression of this tendency,22 although it is important to recognise that some of the most 
prominent advocates of a distinctive ‘Asian way’ have also depicted differences in 
political and social practices between ‘the West’ and ‘Asia’ in civilisational terms.23 
Critics of such all-encompassing discourses have rightly drawn attention to the emptiness 
of such categorisations which gloss over myriad differences within regional social 
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practices and traditions, and which seem designed to legitimate particular forms of rule 
and social control by ‘creating new ideological orthodoxies, based on a contrived notion 
of a pan-Asian culture and value system’.24 In short, amongst critics of the Asian values 
discourse there is the widely held view that it is little more than an obfuscatory  veneer 
intended to disguise and legitimate continuing authoritarian rule and the maintenance of 
the status quo. While there is much validity in such criticisms, it would be a misleading to 
see the emergence of the Asian values discourse in exclusively self-serving political 
terms. When seen against the historical backdrop of the region’s economic development 
and contact with the West, the Asian values discourse can be read as a defence of Asian 
patterns of economic management which privilege  more comprehensive forms of 
security. 
 
From the perspective of economic policy and security, one of the underlying themes – 
and one of the key justifications for state, rather than market-based responses to 
international economic integration – is the disadvantage posed by late development. An 
East Asian predilection for the mercantilist ideas of Friedrich List rather than the 
invisible hand of Adam Smith has been most apparent in Japan,25 but economic ideas that 
are at odds with Western orthodoxy are an integral part of much Asian thinking. For East 
Asian leaders like Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad the central justification 
for extensive government involvement in economic activity (for which Japan has 
provided a clear role model), is that it is necessary to overcome the disadvantages of late 
industrialisation. In a global economy dominated by the established industrial powers, 
Mahathir has been able to deflect criticisms of the more overtly political elements of the 
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Asian values discourse by claiming that Western concerns with human rights are simply 
stratagems intended to constrain economic development and minimise the region’s 
competitive advantages.26 While there is clearly much that is self-serving in this line of 
argument it is also important to acknowledge that, firstly,  it is difficult for industrialising 
economies to break into the most lucrative sectors of global production, and that, 
secondly, all of the established industrial powers enjoyed state assistance during their 
own early phase of industrialisation.27 
 
Prior to the crisis, such ideas had, paradoxically enough, generated a degree of hubris 
amongst some of the more prominent figures in Asian policy discourses. Kishore 
Mahbubani, for example, argued that American attempts to create a ‘level playing field’ 
of a sort that is at the heart of APEC’s reformist agenda, were futile because Japanese 
companies would out perform them under any circumstances. Until the US in particular 
and the West in general absorbed ‘the best of Asian civilisations’, they would  simply be 
unable to compete effectively.28 Clearly, such claims have a hollow ring in the wake of 
the crisis and the continuing difficulties faced by the Japanese economy. However, the 
significance of such ideas in the current crisis is not whether they represent an accurate 
analysis of the comparative positions of East Asian or Anglo-American forms of 
capitalism, nor whether state-led forms of economic development are ultimately likely to 
prove more or less ‘successful’ than any other. The key point here is that such ideas and 
perspectives exist at all.  
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When seen in the light of East Asia’s contingent developmental experiences, its 
problematic and ambiguous relationship with the West, and an emergent regional identity 
centred on distinctive political, economic and social practices, then resistance to the 
‘Americanisation’ of Asia and the desire to establish an ‘Asian united front’ becomes 
more understandable.29 Although a number of the smaller economies of East Asia in 
particular are relatively powerless to oppose the imposition of market-centred reforms 
under IMF auspices, this does not mean that they will necessarily be adopted with great 
enthusiasm or endure. 
 
Post-crisis reform 
 
It might be supposed that in the post-crisis environment, implementing pro-market 
reforms would be a relatively straightforward exercise. After all, in the eyes of many 
observers the ‘Asian model’ is not simply synonymous with ‘crony capitalism’ and gross 
inefficiencies, but it is simply unsustainable in an era dominated by the unstoppable 
forces of globalisation. Indeed, it might be expected that APEC would finally be able to 
achieve the sorts of reforms it has been championing with  little success for a decade. 
And yet APEC has been conspicuous by its absence, while  a number of countries in the 
region continue to display a reluctance to embrace the sorts of reforms deemed 
indispensable by the IMF and most orthodox commentators.30 
 
What is of greatest interest here, therefore, is not debates about the possible causes of 
East Asia’s economic collapse, but some of the policy responses it generated amongst the 
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nations of East Asia. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between those 
economies that were most dramatically affected – Thailand, South Korea and especially 
Indonesia – and the other countries of the region which have been able to ride out the 
storm more successfully.31 Clearly, those countries that found themselves subjected to 
massive capital flight and a collapse in ‘investor confidence’ were in an extremely 
vulnerable position and therefore less able to resist the strictures of the IMF and its 
thorougoing reform packages. Yet, even amongst the most grievously affected Asian 
nations the behaviour of both political elites and the wider populations displayed 
noteworthy deviations from what much Western economic and political theory might 
lead us to expect. In South Korea, for example, the response to economic collapse was a 
sense of national humiliation that led many ordinary Koreans to donate their own 
personal wealth in an effort to bail-out the economy and retain a degree of national 
autonomy. More importantly in the longer term, perhaps, the reform process itself 
appears to have been half-hearted, with some of the chaebols actually managing to 
increase their influence over domestic  economic activity as lending collapsed to all but 
the highest profile companies.32 
 
Predictably enough, Malaysia has been at the forefront of attempts to both resist the 
perceived onslaught of neoliberal reforms and to develop a policy response that permits 
greater domestic economic autonomy. Malaysia’s answer to the destabilising and 
politically constraining power of financial markets was to impose controls on its 
currency, principally by ending trade in the ringgit outside Malaysia.33 While this move 
was greeted with widespread scepticism and condemnation in the West, within Asia the 
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attraction of currency controls actually appeared to increase.34 That Malaysia’s move 
should be viewed positively in Asia is perhaps less surprising given the comprehensive 
failure of the IMF’s reform packages to achieve their immediate goal and restore 
stability. Yet the Malaysian response had attractions that went beyond the immediate 
crisis and the IMF’s comparative failures. The key advantage of the attempted insulation 
of national economic space from the perspective of the Malaysian government was that it 
allowed them to stimulate domestic growth, free of the high interest rate regimes imposed 
elsewhere by the IMF. The other great attraction of the Malaysian response, and the 
reason that it was viewed sympathetically elsewhere, was that it potentially allowed 
national governments to regain or retain control over their economies.  
 
In Hong Kong’s case a significant degree of domestic autonomy had already  been 
retained before the crisis by the utilisation of a currency board – something its much 
stronger economic position allowed it to implement successfully in a way Indonesia 
could not, despite a strong desire to do so. What has distinguished Hong Kong’s response 
to the crisis, however, has been its decision to flout conventional Western wisdom even 
further by directly intervening and spending $15 billion in the futures and stock markets 
in an effort to discourage speculative attacks on its currency.35  At one level, these policy 
initiatives can be seen as an ad hoc response to the novel challenges thrown up by 
globalisation in general and the increased integration of financial markets in particular. 
Simply put, there is currently little consensus about the best ways of managing the new 
international economy: one of the ironies of the entire crisis has been the position of 
mainland China, which has received almost universal praise for not following the 
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neoliberal orthodoxy and allowing its currency to ‘float’. At another level, however, the 
responses of key economies in East Asia must be seen as an attempt to retain a degree of 
economic and political autonomy in the face of external economic pressures. In other 
words, economic security is considered to be intimately bound-up with continuing 
political control. 
 
The sustainability of East Asian forms of economic security 
 
So far I have suggested that there are a number of factors which have militated against 
the embrace of APEC-sponsored neoliberal reforms in East Asia.  Comparatively late 
industrialisation, the success of the developmental state, the antinomies of Western 
capitalist expansion, and the emergence of a discourse that attempted to legitimate an 
‘Asian way’ of organising political and economic activity all sustain an enduring caution 
towards the West and help to explain why APEC had made comparatively little impact on 
East Asia. Moreover, the long-term institutionalisation of alternative political 
relationships and economic structures has meant that there has been a good deal of 
resistance to changes that have the potential to undermine existent distributional 
coalitions within the region. To put the matter bluntly, not only was there wide-spread 
scepticism about the supposed technical merits of the market model, but APEC’s 
voluntarist, consensual approach meant that there was little pressure on dissenting nations 
to comply with moral suasion and thus undermine a status quo that was until recently at 
least synonymous with rapid economic expansion. There are, however, a number of 
forces at work in both the region and the wider international political economy that cast 
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doubt on the ability of East Asian states to insulate or control domestic economic activity 
in the longer term. 
 
The most visible manifestation of the new reformist pressures is the activities of the US 
and its institutional handmaiden, the IMF. As I have considered this relationship and its 
impact on the region in more detail elsewhere,36  only the more general features of this 
process will be considered here. Two aspects of this remarkable public policy activism 
merit emphasis here: first, the prominent role of the US is a dramatic indication of 
continuing dominance of the US and the relative decline of East Asia. Simply put, the US 
may not be as ‘hegemonic’ as it once was, but it retains an unparalleled ability to shape 
the international political economy. Second, the prominence of the IMF is indicative of 
the increasingly important role played by transnational or inter-governmental institutions. 
From the perspective of East Asian nations, both of these developments are major threats 
to notions of economic security predicated on the continuing ability of nation-states to 
control ‘domestic’ economic space. Not only is the US taking advantage of the unique 
historical circumstances of the crisis to push its market-centred reform agenda, but 
national governments are seeing their authority steadily ‘leaking’ to a range of non-state 
actors.37 Ultimately, it is this latter phenomenon that may be the greatest threat to East 
Asian patterns of political and economic organisation. 
 
East Asian states find themselves in a seemingly irresistible long-term ‘pincer movement’ 
that threatens to irrevocably undermine state control of the sort that has distinguished the 
region until recently. On the one hand, powerful actors like the US and a number of 
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transnational bodies like the IMF, APEC and the World Trade Organisation have exerted 
considerable pressure to liberalise domestic economic activity.  On the other hand, the 
very reforms such pressures encourage effectively reconfigure the balance of domestic 
interests and create further pressure for additional liberalisation. These processes are 
particularly evident in Japan, a country which remains pivotal in East Asia’s overall 
position.  
 
As Japan has gradually acceded to US pressure to liberalise its domestic economy, this 
has led to an inevitable diminution of government control. Financial sector deregulation 
has simultaneously deprived the Japanese government of key policy instruments and 
economic leverage, while simultaneously opening up a range of new options for 
domestically-based economic actors who can take advantage of an increasingly integrated 
international economic system.38 In other words, the very idea of a discrete ‘national 
economy’ is becoming increasingly anachronistic in an era when even an economy as 
notoriously ‘closed’ as Japan’s is becoming increasingly penetrated by international 
capital flows and rising - albeit still low - levels of foreign ownership and control. This is 
not to say that the existent position of Japanese companies in the region will not ensure 
the continuing dominance and reflection of ‘Japanese interests’ for the foreseeable future. 
What it does suggest, however, is that the sorts of closely co-ordinated policy regimens in 
which state and capital collaborated in the ‘national interest’,  which were the hallmark of 
the developmental state in the region’s high-growth phase, are likely to be difficult to 
sustain. At a time when the Japanese model has been subjected to a number of powerful 
and persuasive critiques,39 and when there is a mounting sense of domestic economic 
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insecurity that threatens to unravel the social foundation of the former model, then the 
very basis of and rationale for East Asian notions of economic security looks increasingly 
fragile. 
 
And yet neither the depth of resistance to neoliberal reform, nor the potential for 
indigenous regional responses that preserves the existent order should be underestimated. 
Japan’s offer to create an Asian monetary fund (AMF) with which to stabilise economic 
activity in the region would not only have represented an important counter to the 
influence of the US and the IMF, but it would have greatly reduced the ‘conditionality’ 
constraints that the latter was able to impose in return for its assistance.40 In other words, 
an Asian response to the crisis might have adopted a much more permissive view of 
regional economic and political practices. Significantly, the AMF proposal has not been 
abandoned,41 and may yet provide the basis for a region-wide response to the crisis and 
its aftermath. A co-ordinated regional response might allow national governments to 
reclaim precisely the sort of authority over non-state and market sector actors that are 
currently presenting such enduring challenges to East Asian political elites and their 
search for economic security. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The political economy of East Asia has been shaped by an historical interaction between 
states and markets in which the retention of political influence over economic activity has 
been a key goal  and central to East Asian notions of security. In such an environment, it 
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is not difficult to see why the market-centred policy agendas of institutions like APEC 
have been treated cautiously at best and actively undermined at worst.42 This is not to say 
that the governments of East Asia are invulnerable to such reformist pressures, but to 
suggest that they will only be adhered to when  the balance of external and internal forces 
leaves the current generation of policymakers little choice other than to comply. In other 
words, even if the sort of neoliberal ideas APEC champions were the most appropriate 
for the circumstances the region faces – and there is, of course, much debate about this – 
these ideas will not be adopted unless there is a significant change in the overarching 
political circumstances. Without the consolidation of new coalitions of interest within the 
nations of East Asia, and the emergence of a new legitimating discourse which privileges 
market forces rather than state authority, then the development of a new policy paradigm 
in the region will remain problematic and tentative. 
 
However, the possibility that new sources of political power might emerge, which are 
reflective of underlying transformations in the structure of economic activity, and which 
are capable of forming alliances with or exploiting the influence of external forces, 
cannot be dismissed. While this may make APEC’s task potentially easier, it also makes 
it somewhat redundant. Significant changes in the region appear to be being driven more 
by underlying transformations in the structure of the global economy and the 
opportunistic application of political power. If there is to be further change in the 
direction of market-oriented reform, and this is by no means a foregone conclusion given 
the region’s historical development and the existence of entrenched political interests and 
economic practices, then it will be driven by more substantial forces than the existence of 
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a technocratic discourse and the injunctions of neoclassically trained policy advisors. We 
should also remember that any change that does occur is likely to have distinctly East 
Asian characteristics. In the continuing dialectical relationship between states and 
markets that has characterised East Asia’s developmental experience, political forces in 
the region have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to and maintain a degree of 
control over an evolving capitalist dynamic. There is every possibility they will continue 
to do so in the future. 
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